This paper o¤ers a reinterpretation of the Fed's time-varying implicit in ‡ation target, based on two considerations. The …rst one is that the need to alleviate the burden of distortionary taxation may justify the choice of a positive in ‡ation rate. The second one is based on compelling evidence that the degree of price and wage indexation fells with trend in ‡ation. In fact, we …nd that a proper characterization the joint evolution of …scal variables and nominal rigidities has a strong impact on the Ramsey optimal policies, implying optimal in ‡ation dynamics which are consistent with the observed evolution of US trend in ‡ation. By contrast, tax policies have been too lax, especially at the time of the controversial Bush tax cuts.
Introduction
The recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the dynamics of US in‡ation and output volatility, characterized by a post-1981 "Great Moderation" following the "Great In ‡ation" episode of the 1970s. Several explanations have been put forward to the observed gradual reduction in in ‡ation and in macroeconomic volatility that characterized the US economy up to the 2008 …nancial crisis. Some researchers pointed at a change in the stochastic processes driving structural supply and demand shocks (Stock and Watson, 2003; Primiceri, 2005; Sims and Zha, 2006; Gambetti et al., 2008; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008) . Others emphasized the Fed's shift to a rule-based approach, including more aggressive interest rate feedback on in ‡ation (Carlstrom et al., 2009; Taylor, 2012) .
A complementary view pinpoints changes in US trend in ‡ation as a key factor behind the end of the Great In ‡ation and the outset of the Great Moderation (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2011) . Cogley and Sbordone (2009) document a gradual reduction in the underlying core or trend in ‡ation rate. Few macroeconomists would disagree with the statement that trend in ‡ation is determined by the long-run target in the central bank's policy rule, and the drift in trend in ‡ation is usually attributed to shifts in that target. Ireland (2007) estimates a New Keynesian model accounting for an exogenous, time-varying Fed's implicit in ‡ation target. His results suggest that the target gradually rose from slightly above 1 percent at the end of the '50s to over 8% in the second part of the '70s, then it gradually fell to about 2% in 2004. Interpreting this result has proved di¢ cult. A number of contributions suggest that the fed opportunistically transferred supply shocks into persistent in ‡ation changes in order to limit output losses in the 70s when shocks were mainly adverse, and to bring down in‡ation expectations in the '80s and '90s when shocks were mainly favorable (see Ireland and references cited therein). Another interpretation sees changes in US trend in ‡ation as a consequence of policymaker's mis-perceptions and learning about the true structure of the economy.
1 According to evidence provided in Milani (2009) learning accounts for the bulk of observed volatility in US trend in ‡ation, and the implicit Fed's in ‡ation target has remained in the 2-3% range throughout the whole post-war sample.
Leading macroeconomic models …t uncomfortably with empirical evidence and with these interpretations. According to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) theories of monetary non-neutrality (accounting for monetary transaction costs, nominal rigidities, distortionary taxation, the zero lower bound, foreign holdings of domestic currency, the untaxed informal economy) imply that the optimal rate of in ‡ation ranges between the Friedman rule and a number insigni…cantly above zero. Similarly, the implied optimal policy responses to shocks require minimal in ‡ation volatility and permanent debt adjustment in order to obtain tax-smoothing over the business cycle. In this framework it is clearly impossible to rationalize the "opportunistic view" of the Fed's responses to shocks, which should have allowed large and persistent variations in in ‡ation. Even interpretations based on policymakers'mis-perceptions and learning imply a relatively large in ‡ation target. This paper o¤ers a reinterpretation of the Fed's time-varying implicit in ‡a-tion target, based on two key factors. The …rst is a recent theoretical …nding that the need to alleviate the burden of distortionary taxation may justify the choice of a positive in ‡ation rate (and a substantially larger in ‡ation volatility) when total …scal outlays include a substantial amount of transfers in addition to the public consumption expenditures typically considered in macroeconomic models (Di . The underlying intuition is relatively simple. Coeteris paribus, a permanent changes in public consumption cause a fall in private consumption and in real money balances, eroding the in ‡ation tax base. By contrast, an equivalent increase in public transfers has no e¤ect on public consumption and real money balances. As a result the optimal …nancing mix gradually tilts towards stronger reliance on in ‡ation when transfers become relatively large. The second factor behind our interpretation is compelling evidence of a time-varying pattern in the parameters characterizing the pricing behavior of …rms and wage setters, where the degree of indexation typically falls together with trend in ‡ation (Benati, 2008; Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2008) . In fact, we …nd that a proper characterization of the joint evolution of …scal variables and nominal rigidities has a strong impact on the Ramsey optimal policies, implying optimal in ‡ation dynamics which are consistent with the observed evolution of US trend in ‡ation.
In a nutshell, our results are summarized as follows. We see a complementarity between our results and previous interpretations of US in ‡ation that emphasized the role of shocks and learning about the true structure of the economy. Up until the mid-60s the optimal in ‡ation rate was virtually nil, then the contemporaneous increase in public transfers and in the degree of in ‡ation indexation caused a strong increase in the optimal in ‡ation target, 6% by the mid-70s. Finally, in the last part of the sample the reduction in in ‡ation indexation and the stabilization in the level of public transfers cause a fall in the optimal in ‡ation rate. We also determine the pattern of optimal tax policies. Our predicted …scal revenues track the increase in observed revenues fairly closely up to the end of the 70s, but they are systematically larger during the rest of the sample. This result is consistent with observed debt dynamics, characterized by a reduction until 1980 and a large increase thereafter. This is puzzling in the light of received interpretations of the observed patterns of in ‡ation and output volatility. In fact, debt dynamics should have been consistent with the changes in the stochastic processes driving structural shocks. This implies that a debt increase should have been observed in the adverse economic environment of the 1970s, and a contraction should have occurred during the Great Moderation.
Our results also contribute to the ongoing debate about the "great deviation" of US monetary policy in the years preceding the 2007 Financial crisis (Taylor, 2010 (Taylor, , 2012 . In fact our predicted optimal in ‡ation rate is very close to observed in ‡ation. By contrast tax policies appear considerably lax, exactly at the time when the controversial Bush tax cuts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces our theoretical model. We consider a remarkably simple model, which abstracts from capital accumulation but takes into account monetary transactions costs, monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets, price and wage stickiness and in ‡ation indexation. Section 3 presents the results. The …nal section concludes.
The model
We set up a simple DSGE model characterized by standard nominal and real frictions. The nominal frictions include sluggish price and wage adjustments with indexation to past in ‡ation. The real rigidities originate from monopolistic competition in both goods and labor markets. In addition, a transaction technology where money facilitates transactions allows to motivate a money demand function. Exogenous government expenditures (public consumption, transfers and interest payments on debt) are …nanced by a distortionary labor-income tax, money creation (in ‡ation tax), and issuance of one-period, nominally risk free bonds.
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure 1. Household i's preferences are:
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor,
is a consumption bundle, l t;i is a di¤erentiated labor type that is supplied to all …rms.
The household's ‡ow budget constraint is
where W t;i is the nominal wage; t is the labor income tax rate; T t denotes …scal transfers; t are …rms pro…ts; R t is the gross nominal interest rate, B t;i is a nominally riskless bond that pays one unit of currency in period t + 1. M t;i de…nes nominal money holdings to be used in period t + 1 in order to facilitate consumption purchases. Consumption purchases are subject to a transaction cost, S t;i = s(v t;i ), where v t;i = P t;i C t;i =M t;i is the household's consumptionbased money velocity. We assume that s(v t;i ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and s 0 (v t;i ) > 0. The features of s(v t;i ) are such that a satiation level of money velocity (v > 0) exists where the transaction cost vanishes and, simultaneously, a …nite demand for money is associated to a zero nominal interest rate.
Households also set wages, we assume that the labour market is characterized by monopolistic competition and a sluggish wage adjustment. We model nominal wage stickiness as in Rotemberg (1982) . Each household maximizes the expected value of (1) subject to the labor demand (described below) facing a quadratic adjustment cost
where w > 0 is a measure of wage stickiness and w 2 [0; 1] is the degree of wage indexation to past in ‡ation.
Firms
Each …rm (j) produces a di¤erentiated good in a monopolistically competitive environment using labor services. The production technology is given by:
where z t denotes a productivity shock and l t;j =
is a standard labor bundle. Firm (j) demand for labor type (i) is
where
is the wage index. We assume a sticky price speci…cation based on Rotemberg (1982) quadratic cost of nominal price adjustment:
where p > 0 is a measure of price stickiness and t = P t =P t 1 denotes the gross in ‡ation rate and 2 [0; 1] is the degree of price indexation to past in ‡ation.
Fiscal sector
The consolidated government supplies an exogenous, stochastic and unproductive amount of public good G t and implements exogenous transfers T t .
2 Government …nancing is obtained through a labor-income tax, money creation and issuance of one-period, nominally risk free bonds. Its period-by-period budget constraint is
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), ln g t , where g t =
Gt
Yt , is subject to shocks following an independent AR(1) process.
Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is obtained by solving the representative household's and …rm's problems.
3
The household's …rst-order conditions are:
Condition (8) states that the transaction cost introduces a wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth that vanishes only if v = v . Equation (9) is a standard Euler condition. Equation (10) implicitly de…nes the household's money demand function. Equation (11) de…nes consumer demand for product j. Correspondingly, the consumption price
. Equation (12) de…nes the wage adjustment rule, where w = ( 1) 1 is the gross wage markup; ! t = W t =W t 1 is the gross wage in ‡ation rate; w = 1 de…nes the markup generated by monopolistic competition under ‡exible nominal wages; t = 1+s(vt)+vts 0 (vt) 1 t de…nes the policy wedge, which depends on both tax and in ‡ation distortions.
The …rm's price adjustment rule is:
where p = 1 de…nes the ‡ex-price markup. Equation (13) is a conventional New Keynesian Phillips curve, which simply states that the presence of priceadjustment costs prevents …rms in the short run from setting their prices so as to equate marginal revenue to marginal cost.
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is
The competitive equilibrium is thus a set of plans fC t ; l t ; t ; mc t ; t ; v t g +1 t=0
that, given the policies fR t ; t g +1 t=0 , the exogenous processes fz t ; g t g +1 t=0 , and the initial conditions, satis…es the above …rst order conditions (8)-(14).
Functional forms and calibration
The Ramsey solution is a set of plans fR t ; t g +1 t=0 that maximizes the expected value of (1) subject to to the competitive equilibrium conditions (8)- (14), the government budget constraint (7) and the exogenous stochastic processes driving the …scal and technology shocks.
We assume that the instantaneous utility for the representative household (i) takes the form of a simple log-log function:
and we formalize s(v t;i ) as (16) is as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) . In this case, as B approaches zero, (16) becomes linear in velocity and the implicit demand for money has the Baumol-Tobin square-root form with respect to the opportunity cost of holding money. 4 When 0 < < 1 monetary transaction costs exhibit decreasing returns to scale and the consumption elasticity of the implicit money demand function is smaller than 1.
By combining (10) and (16), we can now derive an explicit money demand function:
The solution of the Ramsey plan requires numerical simulations.
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We set the subjective discount factor at 0:96, consistent with a steady-state 4% real interest rate (the time unit is meant to be a year); Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) transaction cost parameters A and B are set at 0:011 and 0:075 respectively, and the consumption scale parameter is set at 0. The price markups, p is set at 1:2, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a). We choose 1:05 for w . The annualized Rotemberg price and nominal wage adjustment costs ( p , w ) are set at 4:375, 6 in line with Hofmann et al. (2012) , who also report that theses parameters are rather stable during the post-war period. We allow for time variation in the degree of in ‡ation indexation and in the …scal ratios G=Y , T =Y , B=Y (Table 1 ). The in ‡ation indexation parameters are taken from Hofmann et al. (2012) , the …scal variables are obtained from the National Accounts (NIPA) data and from the Economic Report of the President. 
Results
In Table 2 we report the Ramsey optimal in ‡ation rate, R av , its corresponding value obtained when transfers are neglected as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), SGU av , and observed average-in ‡ation values, av , for the whole sample period and for the subsamples 1960-1969, 1970-1984, 1985-2005 . In addition, to get more insights on how the dynamic pattern of …scal expenditure variables a¤ect optimal in ‡ation rates, In Figure 1 we plot , R and SGU where the latter two variables are obtained assuming that, in the absence of shocks, the policymaker reacts to the contemporaneous values of public expenditures (described in Figure 2 and 3) as if they were at their steady state values.
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This is an admittedly rough-and-ready method for capturing the shifting government targets for these variables, but the alternative of …ltering actual public expenditure variables to obtain implicit time-varying targets would not produce substantially di¤erent results. The pattern of SGU is clearly unrelated to observed in ‡ation, it is interesting to note that during the great in ‡ation the relatively large degree of in ‡ation indexation induces the policymaker to choose an in ‡ation rate which is even closer to the Friedman rule! A theoretical interpretation of this result is provided in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011), who show that in ‡ation indexation tilts the optimal in ‡ation rate towards the Friedman rule when the public …-nance motive does not matter. By contrast, Di Bartolomeo et al. (2011) show that indexation causes a substantial increase in the optimal in ‡ation rate when public transfers are su¢ ciently large. In fact R is characterized by a strong increase in the 70s and tracks actual in ‡ation fairly closely since the beginning of the 1990s.
Note that R is very small in the '60s and its increase follows the surge in the level and persistence in actual in ‡ation that we observe since the mid60s. 8 In a sense, we see a complementarity between our results and previous interpretations of US in ‡ation that emphasized the role of shocks and learning about the true structure of the economy. Up until the mid-60s the optimal in ‡ation rate was virtually nil, then the contemporaneous increase in public transfers and in the degree of in ‡ation indexation caused a strong increase in the optimal in ‡ation target, 6% by the mid-70s. Then in the last part of the sample the reduction in in ‡ation indexation and the stabilization in the level of public transfers cause a fall in the optimal in ‡ation rate.
To complete our analysis we discuss the dynamics of tax variables. In Figure  4 we plot observed taxes as a ratio of GDP and the predicted tax revenue ratios associated to the R , SGU tax rates obtained when computing R , SGU . It is easy to see that …scal revenues under SGU simply follow the dynamics of public consumption expenditures. Under R predicted …scal revenues track the increase in actual revenues fairly closely up to the end of the 70s, but they are systematically larger than actual revenues during the rest of the sample. This result is obviously related to the pattern of debt dynamics reported in Figure  3 , where the end of the 70s marks a clear turning point. In the …rst part of the sample the policy mix allowed a large reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Since then, tax policies caused a complete reversal in debt dynamics, and particularly so between 2000 and 2007. This result is puzzling in the light of received interpretations of the observed patterns of in ‡ation and output volatility. and Great Moderation episodes. In fact, a debt increase should have been observed at a time of adverse shocks and uncertainty -the Great In ‡ation episodeand such accumulation should have been reversed during the more favorable Great Moderation period (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004; Di . 
Conclusions
This paper reconsiders the issue of Ramsey-optimal in ‡ation and tax policies in the context of the US economy. We are able to rationalize the existence of a positive, time-varying optimal in ‡ation rate, whose dynamics are driven by the public …nance motive put forward in Phelps (1973) and by changing degrees of price and nominal wage indexation. Our interpretation is broadly consistent with interpretations that see a combination of learning and changes in the stochastic processes driving structural shocks as the key factors behind the Great In ‡ation and the Great Moderation episodes. We uncover a puzzling pattern of tax policies which, in contrast with theoretical macro-models, generated the reduction of public debt at a time of great uncertainty and of adverse shocks, and its accumulation later on, when the economic context was relatively favorable. Interpretations of the great moderation typically overlooked the role of …scal policies, our contribution calls for further research about the (temporary) e¤ect of these policies in dampening macroeconomic ‡uctuations.
